


Top Secret

25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

173

21 October 1967

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400180001-6

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400180001-6

25X1

21 October 1967

25X1

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

25X1

Communist China: Peking apparently is trying to reshape its governmental and party machinery. (Page 4)

25X1

25X1

25X1

*Vietnam:


South Vietnam: President-elect Thieu apparently is delaying decisions on the composition of the new government.



Thieu may be stalling until he can take the matter before the senior generals shortly before the inauguration. If he succeeds in having someone other than Loc appointed prime minister, he will have seriously undercut Ky's influence in the new government.

Heavy fighting erupted in the Saigon area on 19-20 October between US forces participating in Operation FAIRFAX and an enemy force of undetermined size. The allied units are attempting to prevent the assembly of enemy troops and weapons for a possible terrorist attack on the city during the upcoming inauguration period. Recently captured enemy documents stress the importance of increasing terrorist activity in the area.

North Vietnam:



25X1


25X1


21 Oct 67

1

25X1

25X1



Recent photography indicates that repairs to the Hanoi Power Plant are proceeding slowly and that the plant cannot be completely restored before the end of the year. The capital city has, nevertheless, managed to meet its basic power needs by using diesel-operated generators to back up the remaining capacity of the plant, believed to be about half of its normal output. 

25X1

21 Oct 67

2

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400180001-6

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400180001-6

Communist China: Peking appears to be making tentative efforts to reshape its battered governmental and party machinery.

Important leaders, who were frequently referred to at the height of the Cultural Revolution only as "responsible officials," are now being identified in the press and radio by the full list of their party and governmental titles. References to the Communist Party itself have also become more frequent.

On 17 October Peking gave wide publicity to new orders from Mao Tse-tung stressing how important it is to reshape "revolutionary great alliances"--consolidated groupings of individual Red Guard organizations--so that they correspond to existing trade, industrial, and administrative organs at the local level.

In ordering this consolidation, Peking has acknowledged again that past disorders resulted in part from competition among differing Red Guard groups inside a production or administrative unit. A People's Daily editorial on 18 October which asserted flatly that the Cultural Revolution "has won a decisive victory" emphasized the need for a "unified command to coordinate actions."

The "alliances" are a first step toward setting up larger administrative bodies, composed of regular party officials, Red Guards, and army elements. Such bodies have already been recognized by Peking as the controlling authority in a number of provinces. Peking has been publicizing recent efforts to set up these larger organs in additional provinces.

According to a broadcast on 17 October, the Military Affairs Commission of the party has spelled

21 Oct 67

4

out the army's role in carrying out Mao's new instructions. Party committees in military units were directed to hold special conferences at which lessons learned during the "previous stage" of the Cultural Revolution were to be summed up and new measures worked out to push the movement forward to a "new stage." Certain army units were directed to publicize Mao's instructions among the masses and to "study together with them." [REDACTED]

21 Oct 67

5


25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400180001-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400180001-6

Top Secret Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400180001-6



Top Secret

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400180001-6